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The Consiience of Inductions takes place when an Induction, obtained from
one class of facts, coincides with an Induction, obtained from a
different class. This Consilience is a test of the truth of the Theory in
which it occurs. - William Whewel 3
As my title indicates, this article focuses on causation evidence in toxic-tort
litigation; and as my sub-tile suggests, it makes two main arguments, the first
epistemological and the second legal. The epistemological argument is that, under
certain conditions, a congeries of evidence warrants a conclusion to a higher degree than
any of its components alone would do; the legal argument, interlocking with this, is that
our evidence law imposes a kind of atomism than can actually impede the process of
arriving at the conclusion most warranted by the evidence - the effects of which have
been especially salient to causation evidence in toxic-tort cases.
Section 1 will set the stage by looking at some cases where the epistemological
issue to be tackled here came explicitly to courts' attention; section 2 will develop the
epistemological argument, first in a general form, and then as it applies to the kinds of
causation evidence typically encountered in toxic-tort litigation; section 3 will rely on this
account to answer some of the epistemological questions about causation evidence that
have been at issue in such cases; and section 4 will develop the legal argument, showing
that, ironically enough, Dauberfs requirement that expert testimony be reliable may
1 © Susan Haack 2008.
2 Distinguished Professor in the Humanities, Cooper Senior Scholar in Arts and Sciences,
Professor of Philosophy, Professor of Law, University of Miami.
3 William Whewell, Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, in Selected Writings of William
Whewell, 212-259, 257 (Yehuda Elkana, ed., 1984) (The word "consilience," which I believe
Whewell introduced, derives from the Latin "con" and "siliere," "jumping together").
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sometimes stand in the way of an adequate assessment of the reliability of causation
evidence.
1. Setting the Stage
Mary Virginia Oxendine was born in 1971. Her right forearm was
foreshortened, and she had only three fingers, fused together, on her right hand.
Believing that their daughter's birth defects had been caused by her mother's taking
Bendectin for morning-sickness while pregnant with Mary, the Oxendines sued the
manufacturers, Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.
4
At the first jury trial, Dr. Alan Done testified for the Oxendines that certain
anti-histamines are known to have teratogenic effects on animals, and that one
ingredient of Bendectin is the anti-histamine doxylamine succinate; that animal studies
conducted by Merrell Dow found small limb alterations in the fetuses of pregnant
rabbits given Bendectin - alterations the company scientists disregarded as insignificant
- as well as miscarriages which, Dr. Done believed, may have occurred because the
babies were malformed; that in vitro studies conducted by the National Institutes of
Health found that Bendectin interfered with the development of limb-bud cells; and that
the data from an epidemiological study conducted for Merrell Dow by Drs. Bunde and
Bowles, when adjusted to exclude Canadian subjects (who could have bought the drug
without a prescription), revealed that mothers who took Bendectin had a 30% greater
risk of having a deformed baby.5 Dr. Done explained that his belief that Mary
Oxendine's birth defects had been caused by the Bendectin her mother had taken during
the period of pregnancy in which fetal limbs were forming was based, not on any one of
these studies or any one of these lines of evidence by itself, but on all of the various
pieces of evidence to which he testified, takeni together.6
4 Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. 506 A.2d 1100 (D.C. 1986), on remand, 563 A.2d 330
(D.C. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1074 (1990), on remand, 593 A.2d 1023 (D.C. 1991), on remand,
649 A.2d 825 (D.C. 1994), on remand, Civ. No. 82-1245, 1996 WL 680992 (D.C. Super. Oct. 24,
1996). The description of Ms. Oxendine's birth defects comes from Oxendine, 506 A.2d at 1103.
5 Oxendine, 506 A.2d at 1104-109 (reporting part of Dr. Done's testimony). What I have given in
the text is obviously only a very sketchy summary of Dr. Done's testimony; he was on the
witness stand for three and a half days, and the transcript of his testimony runs to almost 600
pages. Id. at 1108.
6, Oxendine, 506 A.2d at 1108 (reiterating that "[Dr. Done] conceded his inability to conclude that
Bendectin is a teratogen on the basis of any of the individual studies which he discussed, but he
also made clear that all of these studies must be viewed together, and that, so viewed, they
supported his conclusion").
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In 1983, at the first trial, a jury awarded the Oxendines $750,000 in
compensatory damages. But, overriding this decision, writing that "it is clear... that no
conclusion one way or the other can be drawn from any of the above relied upon bases respecting
whether Bendectin is a human teratogen,"7 the court granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The Oxendines appealed; and the Court
of Appeals reversed and remanded with instructions to reinstate the jury verdict, finding
that the trial court had erred in emphasizing Dr. Done's acknowledgment that none of
the individual studies to which he testified was sufficient by itself to establish causation,
and "failing to consider [his] testimony that all of the studies, taken in combination, did
support such a finding." Associate Judge Terry continued:
Like the pieces of a mosaic, the individual studies showed little or
nothing when viewed separately from one another, but they combined to
produce a whole that was greater than the sum of its partr. a foundation for Dr.
Done's opinion that Bendectin caused appellant's birth defects.
8
Of course, this was not the end of the Oxendine story: in fact the case went to
the D.C. Court of Appeals three more times before it was finally resolved in 1996. On
remand, Merrell Dow moved for a new trial, claiming that Dr. Done had misrepresented
his credentials;9 and in 1988 this motion was granted. The Oxendines appealed again and
in 1989, finding that the trial judge had erred in granting a new trial, the Court of
Appeals reversed again, once more ordering the trial court to reinstate the original
verdict. 10 Back at the trial court, the Oxendines asked the court to enter a judgment
affirming the verdict, but Merrell Dow appealed once more; and in 1991 the Court of
Appeals ruled that the trial court could not enter a final, unappealable judgment on
compensatory damages until the punitive-damages stage of the trial was completed.I In
I Oxendine, 506 A.2d at 1103 (emphasis added).
8 Oxendine, 506 A.2d at 1110 (emphasis added) (determining that the trial court's summary
judgment was in error, because when the evidence was viewed as a whole, it was not appropriate
to conclude that no reasonable juror would find for the appellant).
9 Oxendine, 563 A.2d at 332 (reporting that on May 3 and May 11, 1983, Dr. Done had testified
that he was a member of the Wayne State Medical School Faculty, when in fact he had submitted
a letter of resignation on April 24, which was accepted by the Dean on April 29th; and listing
four other respects, in addition to his position at Wayne State Medical School, in which Dr. Done
falsely represented his credentials at trial).
10 Oxendine, 563 A.2d at 331 (finding that the motions judge did not abuse his discretion in
finding that the motion to vacate was timely, but that he did err in vacating the judgment and
granting a new trial). Id. at 338 (reversing and ordering the trial court to reinstate the jury verdict).
11 Oxendine, 593 A.2d at 1023 (reversing award for compensatory damages before punitive
damage stage of trial was completed).
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1993, the Oxendines withdrew their claim for punitive damages, and moved for the
verdict on compensatory damages to be affirmed; and Merrell Dow asked the trial court
to reconsider the original verdict, this time on the grounds that new studies published
since the first trial exonerated Bendectin. The trial court, declining to consider these new
studies, entered a judgment reaffirming the original jury verdict. Merrell Dow appealed
again; and in 1994, acknowledging that "reopen[ing] the trial's determination of scientific
truth" was at odds with the legal concern for finality, 12 and therefore setting a high
standard for Merrell to prevail, the Court of Appeals remanded yet again - as the court
says, reluctantly, and evidently expecting that the case would be quickly resolved in favor
of the Oxendines.
13
But in 1996- now taking into account the new studies Merrell Dow presented,
14
the decisions in numerous other Bendectin cases concluded since the original trial, 5 and
12 Oxendine, 649 A.2d at 831-32 (stressing importance of finality in the legal system). See also Susan
Haack, Irrecondlable Differences? The Troubled Marriage of Sdence and Law, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
(forthcoming 2008) (arguing in part that there is tension between the open-ended fallibilism of
scientific inquiry and the legal desideratum of finality).
13 Oxendine, 649 A.2d at 827 (finding that "we are reluctantly compelled to remand for further
limited consideration"); see also id. at 834 (Associate Judge Schwelb, concurring, commenting that
"[t]he delays to date... have already done intolerable damage [Tihis is not 1982 or 1984 or
even 1990 . . Given where we are today, considerations of finality have become so compelling
that... nothing short of an extraordinarily persuasive proffer by Merrell Dow would warrant...
further delaying Ms. Oxendine's recovery.").
14 Oxendine, 1996 WL 680992 at 14-21 (reporting that Merrell had presented 2 post-1983 meta-
analyses of epidemiological data on Bendectin (Einarson et al., 1988; McKeigue et al., 1994), and
14 epidemiological studies (Golding, 1983; Mitchell, 1983; Aselton-Jick, 1984; Hearey, 1984;
McCredie, 1984; Winship, 1984; Elbourne, 1985; Aselton-Jick, 1985; Zieler, 1985; Jedd, 1988;
Shiono, 1989; Erickson, 1991; McDonald, 1991; Khoury, 1994)). Plaintiffs' counsel argued that
these studies, where they were relevant, were flawed; e.g., that the 1991 Erickson study omitted
crucial safeguards such as "critical times" (presumably, the period of pregnancy in which subjects
took Bendectin), but the court downplayed these criticisms as "counsel's critique of a scientific
study, rather than a contrary scientific study or expert evaluation." Id. at 15 (citing and dismissing
counsel's arguments).
15 Oxendine, 1996 WL 680992 at 4-7 (listing eight federal cases concluded in favor of Merrell:
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 869
(1995); Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 959 F.2d 1349 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S.
826 (1992); Wilson v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 893 F.2d 1159 (10th Cir. 1990); Ealy v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 897 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 950 (1990); De
Luca v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 911 F.2d 941 (3rd Cir. 1990); Richardson v. Richardson-
Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 882 (1989); Brock v. Merrell
Dow Pharm., Inc., 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1989); Lynch v. Merrell-National Laboratories, 830
F.2d 1190 (1st Cir. 1987). The court also mentions B/um and Haner, but observes that both are
on appeal. Oxendine, 1996 WL680992 at 7. Both were eventually resolved in favor of the
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actions of the FDA16 and the Canadian government 7 - the trial court found that this
high standard was met, and found in favor of Merrell Dow.
18
The best known of the other Bendectin cases cited was, of course, Daubert, on
which the U.S. Supreme Court had given its landmark ruling in 1993; 19 and which had
been finally resolved a year before Oxendine, when Judge Kozinski affirmed the trial
court's summary judgment for Merrell Dow. 20 Jason Daubert's birth defects were similar
to Mary Oxendine's, 21 and his parents, like hers, believed these defects had been caused
by Bendectin; but legally Daubert followed a different path from Oxendine. In 1989 the
District Court had granted Merrell Dow's motion for summary judgment after excluding
the Dauberts' proffered expert witnesses on the grounds that scientific evidence is
defendants. See Blum ex rel. Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 764 A.2d 1, 4-8 (Pa. 2000)
(affirming Superior Court's decision in favor of Merrell); Merrell Dow v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d
706, 708 (Tex. 1997) (reversing the court of appeals and finding in favor of Merrell). The two
names of the defendant company - Richardson-Merrell, Merrell-Dow - reflect changes in
ownership over the relevant period. See JOSEPH SANDERS, BENDECTIN ON TRIAL: A STUDY OF
MASS TORT LITIGATION 213-14 (1998) (describing the history of the company); see also MIcHAEL
GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS (1996) (describing the history of Bendectin litigation).
16 Oxendine, 1996 WL 680992 at 23 (referring to a monograph on over-the-counter anti-histamine
drugs issued by the FDA in 1994 that examined doxylamine succinate and concluded that it was
safe to include as an ingredient of such anti-histamines).
17 Oxendine, 1996 WL 680992 at 23 (reporting that in 1988, the consultants for the Special
Advisory Committee on Reproductive Physiology to the Health Protection Branch of the
Canadian government concluded that Bendectin should not be withdrawn from the Canadian
market and that the warning label should be modified in light of the lack of evidence of an
association with birth defects. But see id. at 23 n.45 (noting that plaintiffs' counsel pointed out that
the members of the Canadian panel "were tied to Merrell - a fact of which the Canadian
government was not aware.").
18 Id. at 34. In telling the tangled tale of this long-running legal saga I have relied in part on the
history recounted in Joseph Sanders, Sdence, Law and the Expert Witness, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
(forthcoming 2008). Earlier, Prof. Sanders had speculated, very plausibly, that Merrell Dow
expended so much time and money on its defense in Oxendine "in order to maintain an
unblemished record in the Bendectin litigation. Even one final plaintiff verdict might make it
more difficult to argue for a summary judgment in other cases." See SANDERS, supra note 15, at
30.
'9 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (determining standard for admitting
expert scientific testimony at a federal trial).
20 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1322 (9th Cir. 1995) (affirming summary
judgment).
21 See Natalie Angier, High Court to Consider Rules on Use of Sientific Evidence, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 2,
1993, at 1, available at ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851-2003)
(reporting that "Jason Daubert, of San Diego, was born 19 years ago with only two fingers on his
right hand and without a lower bone on his right arm.").
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admissible only if it is "sufficiently established to be generally accepted in the field to
which it belongs,"2 2 and finding that, since none of the numerous published
epidemiological studies had found a statistically significant association between
Bendectin and birth defects, the Dauberts' experts' opinions were not generally accepted
in the field to which they belonged, and hence not admissible. The Court of Appeals for
the 9th Circuit affirmed, specifically citing Fgye.23 And because of this reliance on Frye -
almost unprecedented in a civil case24 - the Supreme Court granted certiorari, to
determine whether or not Frye had been superseded when the Federal Rules of Evidence
(FRE) were adopted in 1975.
An amicus brief from Kenneth Rothman and other epidemiologists raised
several important epistemological issues; the lower courts' analyses in Daubert, these
amici argued, put too much weight on whether studies were statistically significant, over-
estimated the importance of peer-reviewed publication 25 - and, most to the present
purpose, they 'foredose[d] the use of valid inferences that may be drawn from the combination of
22 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 721 F. Supp. 570, 572 (S. D. Cal. 1989) (citing United
States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508, 510 (9th Cir. 1988)) (citing United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541,
556 (6th Cir. 1977)) (citing Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923)).
23 SeeDaubertv. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc, 951 F.2d 1128, 1129-1131 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Fye,
293 F. at 1014).
24 Kenneth J. Cheseboro, Galileo's Retort Peter Huber's Junk Scholarship, 42 Am. U. L. REV. 1637,
1695 (1993) (reporting that "there was not a single case decided by the federal appellate courts
prior to 1975 that applied the Frye rule in a civil case of any kind. As of April 7, 1993, only three
such decisions had been reported, two of which were decided in 1991"). The three decisions
were: Christopherson v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1115-16 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied
503 U.S. 912 (1992); Daubert, 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991); Barrel of Fun, Inc. v. State Farm Fire
and Casualty Co., Inc., 739 F.2d 1028, 1031 (5th Cir. 1988). See Cheesboro, supra, at 1695 n.264.
Whether Christophersen really "relies" on Frye might be questioned, since the court lists four
considerations, of which Fgye is only one. See Christopherson, 939 F.2d at 1110. When the Supreme
Court denied cert. in 1992, however, Justice White, with Justice Blackmun, dissented, arguing that
the question, whether Fye had been superseded by the FRE, "is an important and recurring
issue." Christopherson v. Allied Signal Corp., 503 U.S. 912, 913 (1992) (White, J., dissenting)
(contending cert. should be granted). Barrel of Fun, which more unambiguously relies on Fye, was
a fire-insurance fraud case in which the excluded evidence involved a "psychological stress
evaluation" of proffered testimony, which the court held to be essentially similar to polygraph
evidence, which was the kind of evidence at issue in Frye. See Barrel of Fun, Inc., 739 F.2d at 1029
(seeing the evidence at issue as essentially similar to the excluded evidence in Fye).
2z See also Brief for Petitioners, Daryl E. Chubin, Ph.D et al. as Amici Curiae, Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (dealing primarily with peer review); see also Susan Haack,
Peer Review and Publication: Lessonsfor Layers, 36 STETSON L. REV. 789 (2007) (distinguishing broad
and narrow concepts of peer review and exploring their role in Daubert and subsequent litigation).
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many studies, even when none of the studies standing alone would justify such inferences."26 But the
Supreme Court's ruling - that Fye had been superseded, but that FRE 702 still required
that courts screen proffered expert testimony for reliability as well as relevance - does
not pick up this theme. However, Justice Blackmun's ruling had continued by stressing
that in screening for reliability courts should look, not to an expert's conclusions, but to
his "methodology." 27 And so, when General Ekctic Co. v. Joiner28 came to the Supreme
Court in 1997, the dispute over the question of the joint weight of combined causation
evidence was couched in terms of the parties' rival experts' "methodologies."
Robert Joiner, who had worked for many years as an electrician for a
municipality in Georgia, was diagnosed with small-cell lung cancer in 1991; he was only
37. Believing that his cancer had been promoted by his exposure to polychlorinated
biphenyls (PCBs) contaminating the insulating oil in the transformers his job required
him to disassemble and repair, he sued the manufacturer, General Electric Co. (G.E.).
Mr. Joiner's attorneys had proffered a number of expert witnesses, who proposed to
testify to a variety of toxicological, in vitro, in vivo, and epidemiological studies; arguing
that, taken together, this congeries of evidence would be sufficient to establish causation.
These experts, they explained, used "weight of evidence methodology" - the same
methodology the Environmental Protection Agency used in assessing carcinogenic risk,
and the same methodology G.E.'s own experts used in this very case. G.E., however,
denying this imputation, argued that what Joiner's attorneys presented as reputable
scientific methodology was actually nothing more than the "faggot fallacy": the mistake
of supposing that a pile of weak evidence, if it is large enough, is magically transmuted
into strong evidence.29
The District Court, focusing one-by-one on (some of) the individual studies to
which Joiner's experts appealed, excluded Joiner's expert testimony as inadmissible, and
granted G.E.'s motion for summary judgment. But the Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that where, as in this case, exclusion of expert testimony is outcome-
determinative, appellate review should be especially stringent; and, moreover, found
Joiner's experts' methodology scientifically acceptable:
26 Brief for Petitioners, Professor Kenneth Rothman et al., as Amici Curiae, Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 570 at *10 (1993) (No. 92-102) (emphasis added).
27 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-3 (applying Rule 702 requires "a preliminary assessment of whether
the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether the
reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts at issue.").
28 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
29 See Brief for Petitioners at *49, Gen. Elec. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
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Opinions of any kind are derived from individual pieces of evidence,
each of which by itself might not be conclusive, but when viewed in their
entirety are the building blocks of a perfecty reasonable conclusion, one reliable
enough to be submitted to a jury .... 30
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, to determine the standard of review for
such evidentiary rulings. Ruling unanimously that the proper standard of review
remained abuse of discretion, the Joiner Court sidestepped Joiner's argument about
"weight of evidence methodology" with the brisk observation that methodology and
conclusions "are not entirely distinct from one another," and that a court may
reasonably conclude that there is "simply too great an analytical gap between the data
and the opinion proffered." And then, briefly reviewing (some of) the testimony that
Joiner's experts would have given had they been admitted, the court found, almost
unanimously, that the District Court had not abused its discretion in excluding Joiners'
experts.
31
But on this last point there was one dissenter, Justice Stevens, who argued that
it would have been better to have remanded the case to the Appeals Court for
reconsideration under the appropriate standard of review. Joiner's experts had referred
to numerous studies, he points out, only one of which is in the record, and only sLx of
which were ever considered by the District Court; moreover, he continues, the majority
view on the question of reliability, which required it to play down the distinction of
methodology and conclusions, is "arguably not faithful to . . Daubert.'32 (Indeed: after
all, the distinction of methodology vs. conclusions, which the majority rather casually
sets aside in Joiner, was front-and-center in Daubert).33 And, like the Court of Appeals,
Justice Stevens believes there is merit in Joiner's experts' epistemological argument:
It is not intrinsically "unscientific" for experienced professionals to
arrive at a conclusion by weighing all available scientific evidence - this is not the
30 joiner v. G.E., 78 F.3d 524, 532 (11th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added). G.E.'s attorneys claim that
"[a]lmost [these] very words have been cited by scientists and scholars as violating the
methodology of science." See Brief for Petitioners at *49, Gen. Elec. V. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136
(1997) (citing PETR SKRABANEK & JAMES MCCORMICK, FOLLIES AND FALLACIES IN MEDICINE
35 (Prometheus Books 1990) (characterizing the "faggot fallacy")).
31 See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146-147 (holding that abuse of discretion is the applicable standard, and
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Joiner's experts).
32 Id. at 152 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
33 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 ("The focus, of course, must be solely on principles and methodology,
not on the conclusions that they generate.").
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sort of "junk science" with which Daubert was concerned. After all, as
Joiner points out, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) uses
the same methodology to assess risks, albeit using a somewhat different
threshold...34
Of course, whether, and if so how, a compilation of pieces of evidence none of
which is sufficient by itself to warrant a causal conclusion to the required degree of
proof might do so jointly is a question that arises over and over in toxic-tort cases,
though not usually as explicitly as in Oxendine and Joiner.35 The epistemological puzzle
comes out particularly vividly in the first case described here, in Dr. Done's testimony in
Oxendin- the structure-activity toxicological evidence is not sufficient to make the case
for causation, he acknowledges, nor is the evidence from in vitro studies, nor the
evidence from animal studies, nor his statistical re-analyses. But put them all together,
however, he continues, and somehow - presto! - they amount to proof of causation.
3 6
But how, exactly? He doesn't say; and neither, but for his nice metaphor of a mosaic,
does Judge Terry. And so far as I know, this issue has yet to be satisfactorily resolved.
The purpose of the next section is to fill this "analytical gap."
'37
2. The Epistemological Argument
The first thing to notice is that, while up to now we have been approaching it
from the perspective of causation evidence in toxic-tort cases, where legally it has been
especially salient, this epistemological question is really quite general, arising in virtually
every area of inquiry.
38
34 Joiner, 522 U.S. at 153 (emphasis added).
35 But see e.g., Castillo v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours, 854 So. 2d 1264, 1272 (Fla. 2003) (reporting
that "[Dr. Van Velzen] repeatedly asserted that he used the in-vitro testing as one source of data,
in conjunction with other reliable data, to reach the conclusion. He testified that the consideration of
all the data together is a commonly accepted scientific practice.") (emphasis added). I note for the record
that Florida is a Fiye state, and that the standard of review for Frye rulings is de noo.
36 See Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 506 A.2d 1100, 1108 (D.C. 1986) (reporting that
"[t]hroughout his testimony, [Dr. Done] repeatedly stated that his opinion was based not on any
single study or type of evidence, but on four different types of scientific data viewed in
combination").
37 These examples will recur throughout the paper; so perhaps it is necessary for me to say right
away that my argument is not that Bendectin causes birth defects, or that PCBs cause small-cell
lung cancer - or, of course, that they do not. Even if I had all the evidence - which, obviously, I
do not - I would not be competent to make such judgments.
38 See Rothman, supra note 26, at 10 (noting that "[t]his commonsense observation is not novel or
controversial.').
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Think, for example, of that meteorite discovered in Antarctica in 1984 and
believed, on the basis of the gases it gives off when heated, to have come from Mars
about 4 billion years ago. A chemist at Stanford discovered that the meteorite contained
molecules of polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), which are found not only in
diesel exhaust and soot, but also in decomposed organic matter; and other scientists
discovered that the crystals of carbonate in the meteorite were shaped like cubes and
teardrops, like those formed by bacteria on earth. By 1997, Dr. David Mackay of the
Johnson Space Center was ready to say, in an interview for Newsweek, that "[w]e have
these lines of evidence. None of them in itsef is definitive, but taken together the simplest explanation is
early Marian h/' '39 and as more evidence came in over a decade of so of further
research, this conclusion has become more firmly warranted.40 Nor is this an isolated
example; on the contrary, with respect to virtually any well-warranted scientific claim of
any importance - that DNA is the genetic material,41 for example, or that species evolve
through a process of natural selection 42 - the evidence is a complex mesh of interwoven
elements.
Nor, for that matter, is this reliance on many intersecting lines of evidence
confined to the sciences. Think, for example, of a historian relying on archeological and
on documentary evidence (and perhaps also on the scientific theory underlying
39 See Sharon Begley & Adam Rogers, War of the Worlds: There Are No Little Green Men on Mars. But
There Are Some Very Hostile Fellows on Earth Debating Ifhether There was Life on the Red Planet,
NEWSWEEK, Feb. 10, 1997, at 56-58 (emphasis added).
40 See generally Thomas H. Maugh III, Probe Enters Mars Orbit, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2006, at A12
(reporting that it is now known that there was once water on Mars, and that a second Martian
meteorite also contains what may be Martian fossils). See also Michael Hanlon, Is This Proof ofLife
on Mars? The Meteorite That May Final, Have Resolved the Great Mystegy, DAILY MAIL, Feb. 10, 2006,
at 40.
41 In 1944, when Oswald Avery published the report of the experiments that are now recognized
as having established that DNA, not protein, is the genetic material, he was unwilling to draw the
conclusion in print, and it was not generally accepted until after Hershey and Chase's
experiments, published in 1952. See Oswald T. Avery et al., Studies of the Chemical Nature of the
Substance Inducing Transformation in Pneumococcal Types, 79 J OF EXPERIMENTAL MEDICINE 137
(1944); A. D. Hershey & Martha Chase, Independent Functions of Viral Protein and Nucleic Add in
Growth of Bacteriophage, 36 J. OF GENERAL PHYSIOLOGY 39 (1952). By 1953, when Watson and
Crick published their paper on the structure of DNA, the role of DNA in heredity was only very
imperfectly understood, and according to Crick only in the 1980s was the conclusion firmly
established. See James D. Watson and Francis Crick, Molecular Strncture of Nudeic Adds: A Structure
for Deo.,yribonudeic Acid, 171 NATURE 737 (1953); see also FRANCIS CRICK, WHAT MAD PURSUIT: A
PERSONAL VIEW ()F SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 7 (1988).
42 See Understanding Evolution: )our One-Stop Source fir Infornation about Evolution, available at
http://evolution.berkeley.edu (providing a helpful summary of this extraordinarily extensive and
varied evidence when you click on the link headed: W'hat Is the Evidence for Evolution?).
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techniques for dating remains, or for identifying the paper on which or the ink with
which a document is written), or on a combination of written records and the testimony
of still-living witnesses. In fact, this kind of reliance on a whole mesh of evidence is
ubiquitous - the rule, not the exception. It is commonplace in everyday life: when, for
example, after reading a startling story in a newspaper, I buy a different paper, or turn
on the television news, to check whether other sources confirm it.43 And this reliance on
a combination of lines of evidence is familiar in many legal contexts too: when, for
example, we ask a jury to arrive at a conclusion based on the testimony of eye-witnesses
and of a psychologist testifying to the circumstances in which eye-witnesses are more, or
less, reliable, or on forensic evidence and testimony about the error-rate of this
laboratory, and so on.
Because the epistemological question at issue is quite general, we need a general
answer. And warrant is clearly a matter of degree (as I took for granted in describing the
hypothesis that there was early Martian bacterial life as weakly warranted a decade ago,
and significantly more strongly warranted by now), so the answer needs to explain, first,
what factors determine whether, and if so to what degree, evidence warrants a
conclusion; and, second, under what conditions those factors work in such a way as to
enhance degree of warrant when diverse pieces of evidence are combined. My answer
will call on the account of the structure of evidence and the determinants of degree of
warrant that I presented in EVIDENCE AND INQUIRY44 and amplified and refined in
DEFENDING SCIENCE.
4 5
Evidence ramifies, rather as entries in a crossword puzzle do; and my account is
informed by this analogy. How reasonable a crossword entry is depends on how well it
fits with the clue and any already-completed intersecting entries; how reasonable those
entries are, independent of the one in question; and how much of the crossword has
been completed. Similarly, I suggest, how warranted a conclusion is (or, as we might put
it more idiomatically, how likely the evidence makes it that the conclusion is true)
depends on three factors:
43 On a recent visit to Spain, intrigued by their names, I bought copies of both of the two
newspapers published in Murcia: L\ VERDAD ("TRUTH") and LA OPINION. (Friends told me that
LA VERDAD was a very conservative publication, LA OPINION more liberal.) Both carried the
same front-page story, of a woman strangled in the center-of the town.
44 SUSAN HAACK, EVIDENCE AND INQUIRY: TOWARDS RECONSTRUCTION IN EPISTEMOLOGY
73-94 (1993) (2nd ed. forthcoming 2009).
45 SUSAN HAACK, DEFENDING SCIENCE -WITHIN REASON: BETWEEN SCIENTISM AND
CYNICISM 57-91 (2003).
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(i) how strong the connection is between the evidence and the
conclusion - supporivenes,
(ii) how solid the evidence itself is,46 independent of the conclusion -
independent securiy; and
(iii) how much of the relevant evidence the evidence includes -
comprehensiveness.
I note that, though we often speak of degree of supportiveness in terms of how
likely this or that evidence makes this conclusion, or of degree of warrant in terms of
how likely it is that the conclusion is true, these are epistemic likelihoods; they cannot
properly be construed as statistical probabilities. Indeed, given the multidimensional
character of the determinants of evidential quality, there is no guarantee even of a linear
ordering of degrees of warrant, let alone a realistic possibility of assigning (meaningful)
numbers to them.
47
I also note that these three factors are not quite symmetrical. Supportiveness is
directly correlated with degree of warrant; i.e., the more supportive the evidence is of a
conclusion, the better warranted the conclusion (as a crossword entry is more reasonable
the better it fits with the clue and other completed entries). But the connection between
independent security and warrant is a bit more complicated. The more independently
secure evidence for a conclusion is, the more warranted the conclusion; but the more
independently secure the evidence against a conclusion is, the less warranted the
conclusion (as, in a crossword, the fact that our answer to 4 down fits with our answer
to 2 across is the more reassuring the more confident we are that 2 across is right; but if
our answer to 4 down doesn't fit with 2 across, this is less troubling the less confident we
are that 2 across is right). Similarly, the more comprehensive evidencefor a conclusion is,
the better warranted the conclusion; but if making the evidence more comprehensive
also makes it less positive, the increase in comprehensiveness lowers the degree of
4 See HAACK, DEFENDING SCIENCE, supra note 45, at 67-8. "Solid" here means "warranted;" but
this does not lead to a vicious circle; eventually we reach experiential evidence, which neither has
nor stands in need of warrant.
47 See HAACK, DEFENDING SCIENCE, supra note 45, at 75-6 (providing a fuller argument why
epistemic likelihoods do not satisfy the axioms of the mathematical calculus of probabilities). The
thesis is not a new one. See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TREATISE ON PROBABILITY 28 (1921)
(arguing that "[i]t is not even clear that we are always able to place [epistemic likelihoods] in an
order of magnitude"); see also RICHARD VON MISES, PROBABILITY, STATISTICS AND TRuTH 97
(2nd rev. English ed. 1928) (arguing that "our probability theory has nothing to do with such
questions as 'Is there a probability of Germany being involved in a war with Liberia?"').
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warrant of the conclusion (as completing more of the crossword makes us more
confident in the correctness of the completed entries if they all fit together, but
undermines our confidence if it introduces inconsistencies). So a combination of pieces
of evidence will warrant a conclusion to a higher degree than any of its components
alone would do when, but only when, combining the various elements enhances
supportiveness; enhances the independent security of evidence favorable to the
conclusion; and/or enhances comprehensiveness by introducing further, no less
supportive, elements.
If we apply this rather abstract analysis to a schematic example based on the
kinds of congeries of evidence typically encountered in toxic-tort cases, and look at the
effect of combining evidence on supportiveness, independent security, and
comprehensiveness, we will see how combining evidence can - as Justice Stevens and
Judge Terry believed it could - enhance the degree of warrant of a causal conclusion.
Suppose the claim at issue is that exposure to substance S causes, or promotes,
disorder D: e.g., that a pregnant woman's being exposed to Bendectin causes birth
defects in her baby, or that exposure to PCBs promotes the development of lung cancer.
The evidence, E, relevant to the conclusion, C, might include any or all of the following
elements ei, e2, . . e.:
* epidemiological evidence (from clinical trials or medical
surveys) of the incidence of D among those exposed to S, as
compared with its incidence among those not exposed to S;
* meta-analyses of such epidemiological studies, indicating what,
if any, elevated risk of D is suggested by their combined data;
* evidence about whether the incidence of D in the population
falls when S is withdrawn from the market (or cleared out of
buildings, or whatever);
* evidence about what the components of S are (say a, b, and c),
and of whether exposure to any other substance(s) containing
one or more of these, or to chemicals of the same general type,
is associated with elevated risk of D;
2008
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" evidence from in vivo studies indicating whether animals
deliberately exposed to S develop D or precursors of D;
* evidence from in vitro studies indicating whether cells or
embryos deliberately exposed to S develop D or precursors of
D;
* evidence as to whether there is (are) any biological
mechanism(s) by which exposure to S (or to a, b, and/or c)
might cause D, or reasons for believing that S (or a, b, or c)
could not cause D.
But the evidence with respect to a causal conclusion may also include a good
deal of information of other kinds, bearing on it a bit less directly:
* meta-evidence with respect to all the types of evidence listed
above: for example, evidence about what is required of a well-
designed and well-executed epidemiological, toxicological, in
vitro, or in ivo study (e.g., what variables need to be controlled
for, etc.), and what constitutes a well-designed and well-
conducted meta-analysis (e.g., what determines which studies
are good enough to be included in a meta-analysis and which
are best disregarded);
" background information about what other factors (such as
genetic susceptibilities) might contribute to the development of
D;
* background information (or conjecture) about what proportion
of cases of D derive from what kinds of known (or suspected)
cause;
" relevant chemical, biological, physiological, genetic, etc., theory
potentially bearing on S or on D;48
48 For example, as late as the early 1950s it was widely believed that nothing harmful could cross
the placenta from mother to fetus. Since 1955, however, it was known that substances with a
molecular weight of less than 1,000 could cross the placenta into fetal blood. ROCK BRYNNER and
TRENT STEPHENS, DARK REMEDY: THE IMPACT OF THALIDOMIDE AND ITS REVIVAL AS A
VITAL MEDICINE 12 (2001).
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* ideas about what, in what is not yet known, is reasonably
believed to be potentially relevant to the etiology of D.
And there may, additionally, be evidence (meta-meta-evidence?) about the
sources of all these kinds of evidence,49 bearing indirectly on its credibility, and hence, at
one remove, on the credibility of C:
* evidence that relevant studies were published after peer review
in well-respected journals, or were published by editorial
privilege in low-status journals, or were not published at all;
" evidence about who conducted the relevant research: perhaps
the manufacturer, or scientists funded by the manufacturer
(and whether the research was paid for out of the
manufacturer's research budget, or out of its litigation fund), or
university scientists receiving some perks from the
manufacturer, or independent scientists with no connections to
either party in a suit;
* evidence that this witness is (or is not) a repeat testifier in such
cases as this, that his resum shows that he is (or is not) a
professional expert witness rather than an active scientist; etc.
" evidence (meta-meta-meta-evidence?) as to whether studies
funded by manufacturers tend to be more favorable to their
products than studies conducted independently,50 how often
49 Because legal players are not experts in epidemiology, toxicology, etc., and don't have the kind
of extensive background knowledge required to make judicious judgments of plausibility, this
kind of (indirect, external) evidence probably plays a more significant role in legal contexts than,
ideally, it might.
10 In fact, many studies-of-studies confirm that company-funded research on drugs or medical
devices is significantly more likely than independent research to be favorable to the company's
products. See e.g., Richard A. Davidson, Sources of Funding and Outcomes of Clinical Trials, 1 J. GEN.
INTERNAL MED. 155 (1986); Paula Rochon et al., A Study of Manufacturer-Supported Trials of Non-
Steroidal Anti-Inflammatory Drugs in the Treatment of Arthritis, 154 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 157
(1994); Lee S. Friedman and Elihu D. Richter, Relationship Between Conflict of Interest and Research
Results, 19 J. INTERNAL. MED. 52 (2004). While legal commentators tend to be preoccupied with
litigation-driven science, we should not forget that marketing-driven science may also be
tendentious. See e.g. Kevin P. Hill et al., The ADT 'ANTAGE Seeding Trial- A Review of Internal
Documents, 149.4 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 251, 251 (2008) (arguing that internal documents
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peer reviewed papers are retracted,5' whether papers in lower-
ranked journals are retracted more often than those published
in more prestigious fora, etc., etc.
E may be complete (i.e., include evidence of all the kinds listed), or it may be
incomplete; and it may be all positive (i.e., supportive of C over not-C), or all negative,
or mixed. For obvious reasons, in the cases that come to court the evidence is usually
incomplete, mixed or, most often, both; for if it were entirely unambiguous one way or
the other, either the claim would never have been brought, or it would have been
settled.
No single element of a congeries of evidence such as E will be sufficient by
itself to establish a causal conclusion. The effects of S on animals may be different from
its effects on humans. The effects of b when combined with a and c may be different
from its effects alone, or when combined with x and/or y.52 Even an epidemiological
study showing a strong association between exposure to S and elevated risk of D would
be insufficient by itself: it might be poorly-designed and/or poorly-executed, for
example (moreover, what constitutes a well-designed study - e.g., what controls are
needed - itself depends on further information about the kinds of factor that might be
relevant). And even an excellent epidemiological study may pick up, not a causal
connection between S and D, but an underlying cause both of exposure to S and of D;
or possibly reflect the fact that people in the very early stages of D develop a craving for
S. Nor is evidence that the incidence of D fell after S was withdrawn sufficient by itself
to establish causation - perhaps vigilance in reporting D was relaxed after S was
withdrawn, or perhaps exposure to x, y, z was also reduced, and one or all of these cause
D, etc.
53
show that Merck's 1999 ADVANTAGE trial of Vioxx was "a seeding trial developed by Merck's
marketing division to promote prescription of Vioxx (rofecoxib) when it became available ... in
1999.").
51 The medical indexing service PubMeD assigns a number, PMID (PubMed Identifier) to each
article, and it is possible to search for e.g., "Retraction of Publication." On retractions of
fraudulent work, see e.g., Laura Bonito, The Aftemiath of Sdenlific Fraud, 124 CELL 873 (2006);
Harold C. Sox and Drummond Rennie, Research Misconduct, Retraction, and Cleansing the Medical
Literature: Lessons from the Poehiman Case, 144 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 609 (2006);
Jennifer Couzin & Katherine Unger, Cleaning Up the Paper Trail, 312 SCIENCE 38 (2006).
52 As, apparently, was the case with Thalidomide, which has been described as composed of "two
rather innocuous compounds." See BRYNNER AND STEPHENS, DARK REMEDY, supra note 48, at
8 (quoting Dr. Robert Brent; on whom see note 53 infra).
5-1 Dr. Robert Brent, the editor of TERATOLOGY, who testified repeatedly for Merrell Dow in the
Bendectin cases as an expert on "secular trend data," emphasized that, although Bendectin had
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But combining evidence, as in my schematic example, can help exclude
explanations other than S's causing D, and thus warrant the conclusion more firmly. To
understand under what conditions E would warrant C to a higher degree than any of ei,
e2,. ., en individually, we need to look at the effect of combining these on the overall
supportiveness of E, on the independent security of each element of E, and on the
comprehensiveness of E.
(i) Supportiveness How supportive evidence is of a conclusion depends, to put it
quite briefly and roughly, on how well the evidence and the conclusion fit together to
form an explanatory account. So combined evidence will support a conclusion better
than its component parts individually if the conjunction of E and C makes a better
explanatory account than the conjunction of el and C, a better explanatory account than
the conjunction of e2 and C,..., and so on. What makes the degree of support given to
C by E greater than the degree of support given to C by ei, the degree of support given
to C by e2, etc., is how tight its components interlock to form an explanatory account. For
example, evidence of a biological mechanism by which S might bring about D interlocks
with epidemiological evidence of increased risk of D among those exposed to S to
explain a formerly-unexplained aspect of the story; evidence that S contains b, and that it
is b that is associated with increased risk of D, interlocks with epidemiological evidence
of an increased risk of D among those exposed to S to make a formerly superficial
explanation deeper; and background biological, physiological, chemical, etc., theory
interlocks with evidence of the risks to humans of exposure to S to increase the scope of
a formerly narrow explanatory account.
For the elements of E to interlock at all, the same terms ("S," "b," "D," etc)
must occur throughout, as they do in my schematic list; and the elements will interlock
more tightly the more narrowly these terms are characterized, i.e., the more specific they
are. For example, joint support will be enhanced more if "D" is "small-cell lung cancer"
than if it is simply "lung cancer" or "cancer," or if it is "limb-reduction birth defects"
been off the U.S. market since 1983, the rate of reported birth defects had remained steady; but
by a parallel argument to the one in the text, this is insufficient by itself to rule out a casual
conclusion. In fact, we know that after the withdrawal of Bendectin, some doctors began
prescribing vitamin B6 and half a Unisom tablet for morning-sickness, and that doxylanine
succinate, the suspect ingredient in Bendectin, is also an ingredient of Unisom (and of Nyquil).
See Janelle Yates, Nausea and Vomiting of Pregnany: QA with T. Murphy Goodwin, 16.8 BG
MGMT. 54, 55 (2004) (recommending vitamin B6 and, if vomiting continues, adding 12.5 mg
doxylamine by halving the over-the-counter Unisom tablet). On Nyquil (as well as Unisom), see
also Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testimony on Causation in the Bendectin Cases, 46
STANFORD L. REV. 1, 10 (1993).
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rather than "birth defects"; if "b" is "doxylamine succinate" rather than "anti-
histamine," or "Benlate"5 4 rather than "fungicide"; and so on.
The elements of E will also interlock more tightly the more physiologically
similar the animals used in any animal studies are to human beings. The results of tests
on hummingbirds or frogs would barely engage at all with epidemiological evidence of
risk to humans, while the results of tests on mice, rats, guinea-pigs, or rabbits would
interlock more tightly with such evidence, and the results of tests on primates more
tightly yet. Of course, "similar" has to be understood as elliptical for "similar in the
relevant respects;" and which respects are relevant may depend on, among other things,
the mode of exposure: if humans are exposed to S by inhalation, for example, it matters
whether the laboratory animals used have a similar rate of respiration. (Sometimes
animal studies may themselves reveal relevant differences; for example, the rats on
which Thalidomide was tested were immune to the sedative effect it had on humans;
which should have raised suspicions that rats were a poor choice of experimental animal
for this drug.)55 Again, the results of animal tests will interlock more tightly with
evidence of risk to humans the more similar the dose of S involved. (One weakness of
Joiner's expert testimony was that the animal studies relied on involved injecting massive
doses of PCBs into a baby mouse's peritoneum, whereas Mr. Joiner had been exposed
to much smaller doses when the contaminated insulating oil splashed onto his skin and
into his eyes.)5 6 The timing of the exposure may also matter, e.g., when the claim at issue
is that a pregnant woman's being exposed to S causes this or that specific type of
damage to the fetus.
Again, the elements of E will interlock more tightly the more closely in iitro
studies match the conditions of human exposure. For example, the plaintiffs in Castillo v.
54 In Castillo v. du Pont, Benlate was the fungicide to which Ms Castillo claimed she had been
exposed, and which she believed had caused her baby's birth defect, severely underdeveloped
eyes (microophthalmia). Castillo, 854 So. 2d at 1264.
55 BRYNNER AND STEPHENS, DARK REMEDY, supra note 48, at 48. "It was disturbing that
humans responded to thalidomide by lapsing into a 'deep, natural sleep,' but rats did not.. The
fact that no lethal dose for rats could be found seemed doubly disturbing ... the rats simply
weren't absorbing the medicine." Richardson-Merrell was the U.S. distributor for Thalidomide.
Id. at 39. The drug was originally sold as a sleeping pill. Id. at 14. Later, after the Australian
physician Dr. William McBride discovered that it helped with morning sickness, it was prescribed
for that purpose. Id. at 22. Subsequently, Dr. McBride became a hero for drawing attention to the
dangers of Thalidomide, and then notorious, after he was found to have faked results in animal
studies in an effort to draw attention to what he believed were the teratogenic effects of
Bendectin. Id at 27-29, 197-9.
s6 Joiner, 522 U.S. at 144.
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du Pont go to great pains to show that the exposure of cells to Benlate in the in vitro
studies to which they appealed was as nearly as possible the same as the exposure Ms.
Castillo's unborn baby had allegedly undergone when his mother was accidentally
sprayed with Benlate being used on neighboring fields.
57
(ii) Independent securi r combining evidence may also enhance independent
security (as the fact that this crossword entry interlocks with others which in turn
interlock with others, .. ., and so on, gives you more reason to think that it is correct).
To be sure, adding evidence from animal studies won't make a flawed epidemiological
study any less flawed, and adding evidence of a physiological mechanism won't make a
sloppily-conducted in vitro study any more rigorous. (This seems to be the point
Skrabanek and McCormick are making when they explain that the "faggot fallacy" is
fallacious because "a bundle of insecure evidence remains insecure.")5 8 However, if we
add to only modestly secure epidemiological evidence of an elevated risk of D among
those exposed to S, the further evidence that there is a biological mechanism by which S
leads to D, this additional evidence enhances the security of the conclusion of the
epidemiological study. (Similarly, if I add a column of numbers and reach the answer n,
but am not sure my answer is right because I was interrupted in the middle of my
calculation, asking someone else to check the arithmetic and finding that they get the
same answer properly increases my confidence in the answer I got the first time - even
though it doesn't alter the fact that I was interrupted).
(iii) Comprehensiveness. E is of course more comprehensive than any of its
components alone; and this may enhance the degree of warrant of C (as completing a
new entry in a crossword puzzle in a way compatible with the existing entries gives you
reason to be more confident in them all). If, for example, we add to epidemiological
evidence indicating an elevated risk of D among those exposed to S (et), evidence about
the chemical composition of S and the damaging physiological effects of its components
(e2), and evidence of the biological mechanism by which exposure to S causes D (e3),
this combined evidence will warrant the causal conclusion to a higher degree than any
component part of this evidence standing alone. (Evidence of a statistical association of
smoking and lung cancer59 warrants a causal conclusion to a higher degree if it is
57 See e.g. Castillo, 854 So. 2d at 1274 ("Dr. Howard considered what clothes Donna Castillo was
wearing when she was exposed, and her height and weight to determine the amount of skin
exposed, and used DuPont's data to calculate the amount of benomyl [the suspect ingredient in
Benlate] that would have been absorbed and passed though her system.').
58 Skrabanek and McCormick, supra note 29, at 35. See also A. R. Feinstein, Scientific Standards in
Epidemiologic Studies of the Menace of Eveyday Life, 242 SCIENCE 1257 (1988).
5 Richard Doll and Austin Bradford Hill, Smoking and Carcinoma of the Lung: Peliminay Report, 2
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combined with evidence of a causal mechanism; statistical evidence that women are
more susceptible than men would warrant a causal conclusion to a higher degree if it is
combined with evidence of the role of female hormones in speeding things up.)60
However, the degree of warrant will go down, rather than up, if the additional evidence
is negative, or even less positive, than the rest. If, for example, we add to evidence from
animal studies indicating an elevated risk of D in those exposed to S (el), evidence that
an epidemiological study finds no elevated risk in humans (e2), the degree of warrant
given C by this combined evidence will be lower, not higher.
What I have offered is a theoretical analysis, an abstract characterization of the
determinants of evidential quality - an analysis powerful enough, as we have seen, to
show that combined evidence may indeed warrant a casual conclusion better than any of
(4682) BRITISH MED. J. 739 (Sep. 30, 1950) (PMID 14772469); M. L. Levin et al., Cancer and
Tobacco Smoking: A Preiminary Report, 143.4 J. AM. MED. Assoc. 336 (May 27, 1950) (PMID
15415261); C. A. Mill and M. M. Porter, Tobacco Smoking Habits and Cancer of the Mouth and
Respiratoy System, 10.9 CANCER RESEARCH 539 (Sep. 1950) (PMID 14772728); Schrek et al.,
Tobacco Smoking as an Etiologic Factor in Disease. Part I: Cancer, 10.1 CANCER RESEARCH 49 (jan.
1950) (PMID 15398042); E. L. Wynder and E. A. Graham, Tobacco Smoking as a Possibk Etiologic
Factor in Bronchiogenic Carcinoma: A Study of 684 Proved Cases, 143.4 J. AM. MED. ASsOC. 329 (May
27, 1950) (PMID 15415260). These five studies published in 1950 are now seen as ground-
breaking. By 1953, 13 more such studies had appeared.
60 Michaela Kreuzer et al., Hormonal Factors and Risk of Lung Cancer in Women?, 32 INT'L J. OF
EPIDEMIOLOGY 263 (2003) (suggesting exactly this). But see also Leno Thomas, et al., Lung Cancer
in Women: EmeTng Differences in Epidemiology, Biology, and Therapy, 120.1 CHEST 370, 370 (uly 2005)
("[e]merging evidence suggests there are differences in the pathogenesis and possibly increased
susceptibility to lung cancer in women"); International Early Lung Cancer Action Program
Investigators, Women's Susceptibility to Tobacco Carcinogens and Survival After Diagnosis of Lung Cancer,
290.2, J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 180, 180 (July 12, 2006) ("[w]omen appear to have increased
susceptibility to tobacco carcinogens but have a lower rate of fatal outcome of lung cancer
compared to men"); Geoffrey C. Kabat et al., Reproductive and Hormonal Factors and Risk of Lung
Cancer in Women: A Propective Cohort Study, 120 INT. J. CANCER 2214, 2214 (2007) ("[s]everal lines
of evidence suggest that endocrine factors may play a role in the development of lung cancer in
women, but the evidence is limited and inconsistent"); Diana C. Marqu~z-Garbin et al., Estrogen
Receptor Signaling Pathways in Human Non-Small Cell Lung Cancer, 72 STEROIDS 135, 136 (2007)
("[e]strogen status appears to be a significant factor in lung cancer in women ..."); Patricia
O'Keefe and Jyoti Patel, Women and Lung Cancer, 24.1 SEMINARS IN ONCOLOGY NURSING 3, 4
(Feb., 2008) ("[w]omen may be more susceptible to the carcinogenic effects of lung carcinogens
than men. ... Research in this area is ongoing and is highly debated'); Neal D. Freedman, et al.,
Cigarette Smoking and Subsequent Risk of Lung Cancer in Men and Women: Anaysis of a Prospective Cohort
Study, 9 THE LANCET 649 (Jul. 2008), available at http://oncology.thelancet.com (last visited Sep.
29, 2008) (suggesting that the claim that women are more susceptible than men is questionable).
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its components. It does not, however, purport to be a decision-procedure for arriving at
a conclusion about the reliability or otherwise of causation (or other) evidence.
Nevertheless, it sheds some light on the kerfuffle over "weight of evidence
methodology" in joiner. It should already be apparent that G.E.'s accusation that Joiner's
experts have committed a fallacy6' in supposing that combined evidence warrants their
causal conclusion better than its individual elements rests on a mistake. But it should
also be clear - though it is, perhaps, not quite so obvious - that Joiner's appeal to
"weight of evidence methodology" is itself a bit misleading, at least if it is intended to
suggest that there is anything like an algorithm or protocol, some effective, mechanical
procedure for calculating the combined worth of evidence.
This is also apparent if one looks closely at the 1986 EPA Guidelines for
Carcinogen Risk Assessment 62 to which Joiner's attorneys refer.63 These guidelines
advise that ""[t]he question of how likely an agent is to be a human carcinogen should
be answered in the framework of a weight-of-the-evidence judgment";64 however, they
don't use the phrase "weight of evidence methodology," or offer anything like an
algorithm for determining the joint weight of evidence. The section headed
"Categorization of Overall Weight of Evidence for Human Carcinogenicity" simply
describes how categories are assigned: "(1) The weight of evidence in human studies or
animal studies is summarized; (2) these lines of information are combined to yield a
tentative assignment to a category (see Table 1); (3) all relevant supportive information is
evaluated to see if the designation of the overall weight of evidence needs to be
modified"; which amounts to little more than "we look at all the available evidence and
use our judgment to assess what it shows." Table 1 - described as "for illustrative
purposes" only - is a little more specific: for example, it indicates that a substance is
categorized as a human carcinogen only when there is "sufficient" epidemiological
evidence, and as a probable human carcinogen if there is "limited" epidemiological
evidence but "sufficient" evidence from animal studies. 65 But this amounts to little more
than requiring epidemiological evidence before putting a substance in the highest-risk
category - provided that this epidemiological evidence is "sufficient."
The more recent, 2005 EPA Guidelines include a section with the curious but
revealing heading "Weight of Evidence Narrative," which explains that the EPA still
61 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
62 Environmental Protection Agency, Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 51.186 Federal
Register 3392, 34000 (Sep. 24, 1986).
63 Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (Stevens, J. dissenting, citing Brief for Defendants, 4041).
64 EPA Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment (1986), supra note 62, at 33996.
65 Id. at 34000.
2008
JOURNAL OF HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL LAW
"emphasizes the importance of weighing all of the evidence in reaching conclusions
about the human carcinogenic potential of agents" but, moving away from the "step-
wise approach" of the 1986 guidelines, now takes "a single integrative step." Data from
epidemiological studies are generally preferred, "but all of the [epidemiological, in vivo, in
vifro, toxicological, etc.] information . could provide valuable insights." 66 So far,
perhaps, not much more helpful than the 1986 guidelines; but as one reads on, there are
several observations worth noting. First, these guidelines use the same metaphor of
"fitting together" that I have, quite independently, used here:
[t]he narrative explains the kinds of evidence available and how theyfit
together in drawing conclusions, and . . . points out significant
issues/strengths/limitations of the data and conclusions.
67
Second, they take for granted - just as I have here, in articulating to what degree evidence
warrant a conclusion, and when a congeries of evidence warrants a conclusion to a bigher
degree than its components - that warrant is a matter of degree:
descriptors U"human carcinogen," "probable human carcinogen," etc.]
represent points along a continuum of evidence;... there are gradations and
borderline cases ...68
And third, they acknowledge the distinction I have stressed between frequency
probabilities (as in "the probability that a randomly selected Swede is a Protestant is
n%," or "the probability that a 60-year old American male will live to be 75 is mnto") and
epistemic likelihoods (as in "it is overwhelmingly likely that PCBs are carcinogenic"'):
[a]lthough the term 'likely' can have a probabilistic connotation in other
contexts, its use as a weight of evidence descriptor does not correspond to a
quantifiableprobability of whether the chemical is carcinogenic.
69
But when it comes to the core question, "what determines the weight of
evidence?", these guidelines fall back on the so-called "Bradford Hill criteria," drawn
from Sir Austin Bradford Hill's now-classic 1965 lecture, The Environment and Disease.
70
6.6 Environmental Protection Agency, Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, EPA/630P-
03/001F (March 2005), 1-11.
67 Id. at 1-12.
68 Id. at 2-51 (emphasis added).
69 Id. at 2-53 (emphasis added).
71 Austin Bradford Hill, The Environment and Disease: Assodation or Causation?", 58 PROCEEDINGS
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These, however, are not criteria for determining the quality of evidence generally but, as
Hill's title suggests, are focused specifically on medical causation evidence (especially
evidence relating to occupational exposure); moreover, they apply only in a situation
where there is already statistical evidence of an elevated risk of D among those exposed
to S. What Bradford Hill offers is a list of nine aspects of a known association between S
and D that should be considered in arriving at a conclusion as to whether or not the
connection is causal:
(1) Strength: i.e., how large the increase of risk of D is in those exposed
to S;
(2) Consistengy: i.e., whether the association between S and D been
observed by different persons, in different places and times, and under
different circumstances;
(3) Specifidty: i.e., whether the association is specifically between this
substance or occupational exposure, and this disease;
(4) Temporako: i.e., whether exposure to S precedes D (rather than, e.g.,
being associated with the early stages of D);
(5) Biologicalgradien. i.e., whether the incidence of D rises as exposure to
S rises;
(6) Plausibiity:71 i.e., whether the causal hypothesis fits with current
biological knowledge;
(7) Coherence: i.e., interpreting the data as showing causation should not
("seriously") conflict with known facts about the history and biology of
OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF MEDICINE 205 (1965). According to the FEDERAL REFERENCE
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 376 (Federal Judicial Center, 2nd ed. 2000) Bradford Hill
was amplifying criteria proposed by the U.S. Surgeon General in assessing the relationship
between smoking and lung cancer. U.S. Dept. of Health, Educ., and Welfare, Smoking and
Health Report of the Advisory Committee of the Surgeon General (1964).
71 While I was writing this, the press reported that a new study finding Vytorin no more effective
than a placebo with respect to a certain heart-valve condition, had also found an increased risk of
cancer in those taking the drug; but that researchers "declared the latter finding 'implausible' and
probably the result of chance." Their reason, I take it, was that there was no known mechanism
that could plausibly be supposed to explain such a connection. Ron Winslow and Shirley S.
Wang, More /vjtorin Bad News Hits Merck, Schering., WALL ST. J.,Jul. 22, 2008, at B1, B2.
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the disease;
(8) Experiment: i.e., whether the incidence of D falls if preventive action
is taken to reduce exposure to S;
(9) Analogy: i.e., whether there is some similarity to other known cases
of a causal connection.
It is worth noting that Bradford Hill acknowledges that "[n]one of my nine viewpoints
can bring indisputable evidence for or against the cause-and-effect hypothesis, and none
can be required as a sine qua non."
72
It is hardly surprising that these "Bradford Hill criteria" have proved so
durable,73 for they contain much good sense. But they are not really "criteria," at least as
that term is sometimes understood; not, that is, a decision-procedure, or even a check-
list that could be followed mechanically. (The legal term "indicia" might be less
misleading.) Evidence may, for example, satisfy some of these and not others, or may
satisfy some in high degree and others in lower degree; and Bradford Hill says nothing
about how to assess success on one of these indicia against failure on that, or how to
compare hypotheses one of which does well on this and poorly on that, and the other
poorly on this and well on that. This is hardly surprising, either. For in fact - as my
theoretical account suggests, and as the EPA's curious word "narrative" hints -
assessing the worth of complex evidence is, in a sense, inevitably a matter of judgment;
that is to say, someone experienced in the field may see that the causal claim is (to use
Bradford Hill's word) "plausible," because he has brought to bear a whole mesh of
background knowledge and presumption - a mesh of background knowledge which,
however, he doesn't, and perhaps couldn't, articulate fully. Indeed, it is precisely because
the assessment of complex evidence is a matter of judgment in this sense that even well-
qualified and highly-competent experts may reasonably disagree; for unless and until the
evidence is overwhelming one way or the other, subtle differences in the unarticulated
complex of background knowledge and presumption each scientist brings to the table
may produce different assessments.
Still, it may be helpful to map Bradford Hill's somewhat unsystematic list of
72 Bradford Hill, The Enzironment and Disease, supra note 70, at 299.
73 They appear, for example, not only in the 2005 EPA guidelines, supra note 66; but also in
SANDERS, BENDECTIN ON TRIAL, supra note 15, at 55-6, in the FEDERAL REFERENCE MANUAL
ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 70, at 375-6; and in Kenneth J. Rothman and Sander
Greenland, eds., MODERN EPIDEMIOLOGY 24-28 (2nd ed. 1998).
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"criteria" or "indicia" onto the more articulated structure of the account I have
proposed. "Consistency" amounts in effect to acknowledgment that combined evidence
from different sources, provided it all points in the same direction, improves the warrant
of the conclusion that the connection is causal. Bradford Hill's "coherence," "biological
plausibility" and "analogy" seem to correspond to the kinds of evidence included in my
list under "background knowledge" - whatever is known about a potential mechanism
or mechanism by which S might cause D, any biological, physiological, etc., theory, with
which the causal conclusion would fit, and so on. "Specificity" corresponds to the
connection I make between tightness of fit of the elements of E and how narrowly "S"
and "D" are specified; and "temporality" to the fact that an association between S and D
found in even an excellent epidemiological study could be the result of a common cause
of exposure to S and of D, or of the fact that the presence of D itself leads to exposure
to S. "Experiment" corresponds to what I have described as evidence about whether the
incidence of D is changed when exposure to S is deliberately reduced ("secular trend
data," as Dr. Brent calls it); and "biological gradient" is reflected at least in my part by
my observations about the extent and the manner of exposure to S.
While the "strength" of the association between S and D, i.e., how large the
increased risk is, finds its place in my account as relevant to ruling out the possibility that
an apparently elevated risk is the result of chance, it is the first thing on Bradford Hill's
list. He appeals to the example of the incidence of scrotal cancer in chimney-sweeps -
among whom, he reports, even as late as the 1920s the death rate from scrotal cancer
was 200 times the rate among those not exposed to tar or mineral oils.74 It is worth
noting that the connection with "tar or mineral oils" is already built into Bradford Hill's
example, and that the possibility that men in the early stages of scrotal cancer are
somehow thereby attracted to chimney-sweeping as a profession seems so remote as to
be negligible. But the main reason this factor is less prominent in my schematic example
than in Bradford Hill's list is, simply, that the kinds of case that come to court will surely
not be those where the association is so strong that the inference to a causal conclusion
is virtually guaranteed, but are far more likely to be those where, after a drug tested even
in large clinical trials goes on the market, vastly more people take it, and there is
evidence, or suspicion, that there may be unanticipated risks to some sub-group of the
14 Bradford Hill, The Enironment and Disease, supra note 70, at 295, cting Richard Doll, Cancer, in L.
J. Witts, ed., MEDICAL SURVEYS AND CLINICAL TRIALS: SOME METHODS AND APPLICATIONS OF
GROUP RESEARCH IN MEDICINE 333 (2nd ed. 1964). (According to Dr. Doll, in 1775 Percivall
Pott reported that "cancer of the scrotum was characteristically a disease of chimney sweeps;"
and in 1933 J. W. Cook at al. proved that "3:4-benzpyrene was responsible for the carcinogenic
action of pitch on the skin of animals." Id. at 333 dtingJ. W. Cook et al., The Isolation of a Cancer-
Producing Hdrocarbon from Coal Tar, 1 J. CHEM. SOC. 395 (1933).).
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population.
3. Answering Some Contested Questions
The theoretical apparatus now in place suggests (at least the beginnings of)
answers to a range of epistemological questions that have often bedeviled toxic-tort
litigation - questions about proof of general causation (the main topic here), and even
some questions about proof of specific causation.
Is epidemiological evidence of an elevated risk of D among those exposed to S essential to proof
ofgeneral causation?75 "Epidemiologic studies," the 1986 EPA guidelines observe, "provide
unique information about humans who have been exposed to suspect carcinogens."
76
"[D]escriptive" epidemiological studies, they continue, "are useful in generating
hypotheses and providing supportive data," but "can rarely be used to make a causal
inference"; however, "analytical" case-control or cohort studies "are especially useful in
assessing risks to exposed humans."'77 Obviously, well-designed and well-conducted
epidemiological studies showing an elevated risk would significantly increase the degree
of warrant of a causal conclusion; and, of course, unlike animal studies, where there is
always a question whether the animals used are enough like human beings in the relevant
respects, epidemiological studies involve human subjects (which, no doubt, is why Table
75 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 721 F. Supp. 570, 575 (S.D. Cal. 1989) (holding that,
given that there was a vast body of epidemiological evidence regarding Bendectin, expert opinion
not based on epidemiological evidence was not admissible). See also, e.g., Grimes v. Hoffman-
LaRoche, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 33, 35 (D.N.H. 1995) (excluding Dr. Lerman's testimony that
Acutane played a role in Mr. Grimes' developing cataracts in part on the grounds that "[r]ather
than relying on epidemiological data, Dr. Lerman bases his general causation opinion primarily
on scientific theory, an in vitro experiment, and what he considers certain 'generally accepted'
scientific facts"); Sutera v. The Perrier Group of America, 986 F. Supp. 655 (D. Mass. 1997)
(excluding plaintiffs' expert testimony because they have -produced no scientific peer-reviewed
epidemiological studies which would associate APL [acute promyelocytic leukemia] ... and
benzene exposure" at the relevant levels); In re Rezulin Products Liability Litigation, 369 F. Supp.
2d 398, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (excluding plaintiffs' expert testimony that the diabetes drug Rezulin
caused "silent" liver damage, in part on the grounds that "[t]here are no clinical trials and no
observational epidemiological studies supporting the plaintiffs' position"); In re Bextra and
Celebrex Marketing Sales Practices and Product Liability Litigation, 524 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1175
(N.D. Cal. 2007) (excluding plaintiffs' expert testimony that Celebrex could cause cardiovascular
effects at a dose of 200 mg. daily in part on the grounds that "there are no randomized controlled
trials or meta-analyses of such trials or meta-analyses of observational studies that find an
association between Celebrex 200 mg/d and risk of heart attack or stroke").
76 EPA Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment (1986), supra note 62, at 33995.
77 Id.
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1 in the 1986 EPA guidelines effectively allows epidemiological studies to trump animal
studies). Nevertheless, if there is sufficient positive evidence of other kinds, a causal
conclusion might be warranted to a non-negligible degree even in the absence of
epidemiological evidence.
This is particularly significant when, for one reason or another, no relevant
epidemiological studies are available, or possible.78 Michael Gottesman argues that "it is
quite rare" that "conclusive human epidemiological evidence is available";7 9 for when it
is suspected that a drug or chemical may be harmful, manufacturers are likely either to
institute "protective procedures for future use of the product" or else to withdraw it
from the market, which makes such epidemiological work much more difficult. For
example, he continues, PCBs had been routinely used in electrical transformers until
reports began to link them to certain cancers, and they were banned in 1977;80 after that,
they were no longer used in transformers, and there was no longer any realistic
possibility of conducting epidemiological studies of a possible link between PCBs and
the kind of cancer Mr. Joiner developed.8'
In any case, it is important to be clear that "there is no epidemiological evidence
of an elevated risk of D in those exposed to S" is not equivalent to "there is
epidemiological evidence that there is no elevated risk of D among those exposed to S."
(Unlike the so-called "faggot fallacy," confusing these two very different propositions
really is a fallacy.) For example, early on there was no evidence one way or the other
about whether patients who took Vioxx for less than 18 months had elevated
cardiovascular risk - and early on in the Vioxx litigation, Merck argued as if this were
evidence that there was no elevated risk among patients who took the drug only for a
short time.8 2 But when later studies looked at short-term Vioxx use, they found evidence
78 See Castillo, 854 So. 2d. at 1269-70 (reporting that the plaintiffs expert argued that "clinical
epidemiological studies are not available because Benlate is a toxic chemical and thus not suitable
for human experiment," and that "in cases where exposure is very rare to begin with, there are
inherent problems with epiderniological studies because a scientist cannot [ethically] expose a
human to a known teratogen in order to study the effects.").
79 Michael H. Gottesman, From Barefoot to Daubert to Joiner Triple Play or Double Error?, 48 ARIZ. L.
REV. 753, 767 (1998) (Mr. Gottesman argued Daubed and Joiner for the plaintiffs at the Supreme
Court).
8o 90 Stat. 2003, 2025 (1976), 15 U.S.C. § 605 (e).
1 Gottesman, supra note 76, at 767.
82 "In an admission that could undermine one of its core defenses in Vioxx-related lawsuits,
Merck said yesterday that it had erred when it reported in early 2005 that a crucial statistical test
showed that Vioxx caused heart problems only after 18 months of use." Alex Berenson, Alerck
Admits a Data Error on Vioxx, N. Y. TIMES, May 3, 2006, at Cl, available at 2006 WLNR 9291555.
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suggesting that the risk went up as early as the first dose.8 3 This brings home the lesson:
that the absence of evidence that p is just that - an absence of evidence; it is not
evidence that not-p.
If there are relevant eoidemiological studies, and they find no elevated risk of D among those
exposed to S, is this always and inevitaby fatal to a claim of general causation? No, not always or
necessarily. If they are good studies, yes; but if they are significantly flawed in ways that
makes it likely that they underestimated the risk, their negative results are not fatal to
such a claim. In Blum v. Merrell Dow, for example, defendant's expert Dr. Shapiro
acknowledged under cross-examination that his epidemiological study had lumped
together women who took Bendectin during the period of pregnancy in which fetal
limbs were forming, and women who took the drug only after the limbs had formed,
and so may have underestimated any elevated risk of limb-reduction defects.84 Or, to
take a more recent example, we now know that the VIGOR study, Merck's first large
clinical trial of Vioxx, kept track of the gastrointestinal effects of Vioxx for longer than it
kept track of the cardiovascular effects; and as a result, failed to find a statistically
significant elevated risk of heart attack and stroke.
85
In Plunkett v. Merck & Co. (In re. Vioxx Products Liability Litigation, 410 F. Supp. 2d 565, 596-7
(E.D. La. 2005) the plaintiffs moved to exclude Merck's testimony that Vioxx only causes
prothombotic effects if taken for 18 months or more; but was denied on the grounds that both
parties relied on the same study (the APPROVe study), while the court should be concerned only
with methodology, not with the conclusions drawn.
83 Patricia McGettigan and David Henry, Cardiovascular Risk and Inhibition of Cydoooygenase: A
Systematic Review of the Observational Studies of Selective and Non-Selective Inhibitors on Cyclooxygenase,
296.2 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL AssOCIATION 1633 (Oct. 4, 2006) citing studies
finding elevated risk with early Vioxx use: W. A. Ray et al., Cyclo-oxygenase-2 Selective Non-Steroidal
Anfi-Inflammatogy Drugs and Risk of Serious Coronary Heart Disease, 360 LANCET 1071 (2002); D. H.
Solomon et al., Relationsh Between Selective Cydooxygenase-2 Inhibitors and Acute Myorcardial Infarction
in Older Adults, 109 CIRCULATION 2068 (2004); Linda Levesque et al., Time Variations in the Risk of
Myocardial Infarction Among Elder# Users of Cox-2 Inhibitors, published electronically at www.cmj.ca
(May 2, 2006) and, abridged, in 174.11 CANADIAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION JOURNAL 1563 (May
23, 2006).
84 Blum v. Merrell Dow, 33 Phila. Co. Rptr. 193, 215-7 (Ct. Comm. Pleas. Pa. 1996). See also
Susan Haack, What's Wrong With Litigation-Driven Science? An Essay in Legal Epistemology, 38-3
SETON HALL L. REV. 1053, 1066-69 (2008) (scrutinizing the defendant's expert testimony in
Blum).
85 See David Armstrong, Bitter Pill: How the New England Journal of Medicine Missed Warning Signs
on Vioxx- Medical Week4 Waited Years to Report Flaws in Article that Praised Pain Drug - Merck Seen
as 'Punching Bag, "WALL ST.J., May 15, 2006, at Al (exploring problems with Merck's reporting of
the results of the VIGOR study, see also Haack, supra note 25, at 804-7 (discussing problems in the
VIGOR study).
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Is it acceptable to disregard or sinep[y and on prinpk to exclude, epidemiological studies the
results of which are not statistical# significant?86 No. To be sure, the less statistically robust a
study, the less it contributes to the warrant of a causal conclusion. But the crucial point
is that statistical significance is a matter of degree, and that the cut-off degree
conventionally accepted is just that, a convention - a cut-off point adopted by the
relevant scientific community, and set high to ensure that the risk of false positives is
minimized. 87 Bradford Hill was right when he wrote, almost half a century ago, that the
then fast-growing emphasis on statistical significance meant that "too often.., we grasp
the shadow and lose the substance" as we "deduce 'no significance' from 'no statistical
significance.' '88 But the trend he deplored is now firmly-entrenched practice.8 9 And
unfortunately, as Rothman et al. observe in their amicus brief in Daubert "a factfinder
who is told that a body of data is not 'statistically significant' is made to believe that the
data has no value"; and, as they continue, the "talismanic" phrase "statistically
significant" can create the completely misleading impression that statistically significant
data are infallible.90
Dunn v. Sando- Pharmaceutical Coporation9' is especially fascinating for its
confusion over this question. In brief: Ms. Dunn had sued Sandoz, the manufacturers,
alleging that their anti-lactation drug, Parlodel, had caused her post-partum stroke; but
the court excluded her general causation expert, Dr. Kulig, on the grounds that his
testimony was insufficiently reliable to pass muster under Daubert.92 Dr. Kulig testified:
86 See In m. Bextra, supra note 75 (excluding plaintiffs' testimony on the risk of adverse events in
those taking 200 mg. of Celebrex a day in part on the grounds that the epidemiological studies
found no statistically significant association); see also Daubert, 727 F. Supp. at 570 (giving this as
part of the reason for excluding the Dauberts' expert testimony).
87 Moreover, there are different ways of calculating statistical significance, which sometimes give
different results, and the choice of which is sometimes itself a matter of controversy. See e.g.
Keith J. Winstein, Boston Sdentific Stent Study Flawed, WALL ST. J., Aug. 14, 2008, at B6 (reporting
such a controversy).
89 Hill, supra note 70, at 299-300.
Winstein, supra note 87, at B1 (noting that "medical journals typically won't publish" studies
the results of which are not statistically significant).
90 Brief of Professor Kenneth Rothman et al., as Amid Curiae in Support of Petitioers, Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 570 (1993) (No. 92-102) at *4.
91 Dunn v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corporation, 275 F. Supp. 2d 672, 677, 680 (M.D.N.C. 2003).
92 Dunn, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 681; see also Soldo v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d 434
(W.D. Pa. 2003); Caraker v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 172 F. Supp. 2d 1046 (S.D. Ill. 2001). Dr.
Kulig had also proposed to testify to the same effect in these cases, but had been excluded. Ms.
Caraker's attorneys, by the way, had likened the expert evidence they offered asfitfng together like
the pieces of a jigsaw pu-Zle to establish causation. Caraker, 172 F. Supp. 2d. at 1048. (Before I
adopted the crossword analogy, I had for a while worked with Michael Polanyi's analogy, likening
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"I believe causation exists because I've applied the Bradford Hill criteria"; 93 but the
court agrees with Sandoz that Dr. Kulig had misapplied those criteria by failing to notice
that they kick in only when there is already epidemiological evidence of an association
between a substance and a disorder. So far, fair enough. But then the court quietly slips
in an additional phrase: Dr. Kulig would have needed "to have [had] a statistical#
signicant study as the beginning point for the application of the Bradford Hill criteria." 94
The court may have been correct in suspecting that Dr. Kulig's application of the
Bradford Hill criteria was largely decorative, 95 and was certainly correct in pointing out
that these criteria presuppose some evidence of an association as their starting point; but
evidently it was not aware of Bradford Hill's skeptical attitude to the insistence on
statistical significance.
Is it appropriate to disregard (or in principle to exclude) evidence from animal studies?
96 Of
the work of science to putting together a huge jigsaw. See MICHAEL POLANYI, THE REPUBLIC OF
SCIENCE: ITS POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC THEORY (1962); reprinted in Marjorie Grene, ed.,
KNOWING AND BEING 49, 51-2 (1969).
93 Dunn, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 677.
94 Dunn, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 680.
95 In any case, as I argued above, the Bradford Hill "criteria" can be at best indicia of a causal
connection. (Dr. Kulig's testimony suggests a certain ambivalence on this point: "[t]he toxicologic
community, my peers, use Bradford-Hill extensively. ... [In my testimony] I've taken the extra step
and applied a published, generalb accepted criteria to the anasis... And the Bradford-Hill criteria, in my
opinion, it's a generally accepted scientific methodology to the analysis of adverse drug
reactions;" however, he also acknowledges that "you may interpret the evidence differently.')
Dunn, supra note 91, at 677-8. Reading his affidavit in this case, I notice that he writes as if
Bradford Hill had provided a check-list, running through it commenting, e.g., "this criteria
[temporality] is clearly met," etc.; whereas Bradford Hill seems well aware both that many of his
criteria can be met in varying degrees, and that it is necessary to use one's judgment in deciding
how likely it is that the relationship is causal. (I also note, for the record, that "criteria" is plural,
not, as Dr. Kulig seems to think, singular.) Affidavit of Kenneth Kulig, M.D., FAACT, FACMT
at 27-30, Dunn v. Sando7, 275 F. Supp. 2d 672 (M.D.N.C. 2003) (No. 1:98 CV 00912), 2000 WL
34616176.
96 See e.g., Metabolife Int'l v. Wornick, 72 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1169 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (excluding
Metabolife's scientific evidence, in part on the grounds that as a matter of law animal studies are
inadmissible, "due to the uncertainties in extrapolating from effects on mice and rats to
humans."). In 2001 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit reversed this exclusion. See
Metabolife Int'l v. Wornick, 264 F.3d 832, 842-43 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the District Court
abused its discretion in excluding the animal studies); see also In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants
Prod. Lab. Litig., 318 F. Supp. 2d 879, 891 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (excluding plaintiffs' evidence from
animal studies on the grounds that "[e]xtrapolations of animal studies to human beings are
generally not considered reliable in the absence of a scientific explanation of why such
extrapolation is warranted.") (quoting Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1410
(D. Or. 1996)). In Joiner, the District Court had agreed with G.E. that the animal studies on which
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course not. Obviously such studies can contribute to the warrant of a causal conclusion
- the more so, the better-designed and better-conducted they are, using appropriate
animals, doses, modes of delivery, times of delivery, etc. Of course, and no less
obviously, there is always the possibility that animals are adversely affected by S, but
humans are not, and vice-versa;97 and if well-designed and well-conducted tests on
animals show an elevated risk of D with exposure to S, but well-designed and well-
conducted epidemiological studies show no elevated risk of D in humans exposed to S,
we would rightly suspect that there might be relevant physiological differences of which
we are not yet aware.
Is epidemiological evidence of at least a doubling of risk (epistemologicaly) essential to
estabhshing spedfic causation? - i.e., to go beyond the general claim that exposure to S
sometimes causes or promotes D, to the specific claim that it was his or her exposure to
S that caused or promoted this plaintiffs D, is it necessary to show that exposure to S
doubles the risk of D? This is the requirement under e.g., New Jersey law, and was
imposed by Judge Kozinski when he reheard Daubert on remand from the Supreme
Court.98 But it rests on a confusion. The idea behind such a requirement is, presumably,
that only if exposure to S at least doubles the risk of D can we infer that the odds are
his experts relied were inadequate to establish that Joiner's exposure to PCBs had promoted his
cancer; at appeal, Joiner's attorneys (unwisely) argued as if the issue was whether animal studies,
as such, can ever be a proper foundation for an expert's opinion. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522
U.S. 136, 144 (1997).
97 "[O]ne can usually rely on the fact that a compound causing an effect in one mammalian
species will cause it in another species. This is a basic principle of toxicology . . " FEDERAL
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC TESTIMONY, supra note 70, at 410. However, animal studies
have two disadvantages: the difficulty in extrapolating to humans because "differences in
absorption, metabolism, and other factors may result in interspecies variation in responses"; and
because "the high doses customarily used in animal studies" leave open questions about dose-
response relation in humans. Id. at 346.
98 Rehearing Daubert on remand from the Supreme Court, Judge Kozinski argued that the
Dauberts' experts would have to be excluded under the new standards, as they had been under
the Frye Rule; finding that, unless an expert claimed to show that Bendectin at least doubled the
risk of birth defects, he would have to be excluded on grounds of irrelevance. See Daubert, 43 F.3d
at 1320-1321 ("California tort law requires plaintiffs to show not merely that Bendectin increased
the likelihood of injury, but that it more likely than not caused their injuries' (dting Jones v.
Ortho Pharm. Corp., 163 Cal. App. 3d 396 (1985)). The court continued: "[i]n terms of statistical
proof, this means that the plaintiffs must establish ... that [their mothers' taking Bendectin] more
than doubled" the risk. See Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1320; see also id. at 1321 (citing DeLuca v. Merrell
Dow Pharm. Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 958 (3rd Cir. 1990), where the requirement of New Jersey law
that plaintiffs must show that more likely than not Bendectin caused Amy DeLuca's birth defects
is interpreted as meaning that "the relative risk of limb reduction defects arising from the
epidemiological data ... will, at a minimum, have to exceed '2"'.
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that the plaintiff, who was exposed to S and developed D, developed D because he or she
was exposed to S. But this idea rests on a confusion of statistical probabilities with
epistemic likelihoods; and it is clear on reflection that a doubling of statistical risk is
neither necessary nor sufficient for proof of specific causation.
Epidemiological evidence of a doubling of risk is not suffident for specific
causation: first, because if the study showing a doubling of risk is poorly-designed or
poorly-executed, we would have only a low epistemological likelihood of a greater than 50%
statisticalprobabity; and second, because even a well-designed and well-conducted study
might also show that those subjects who develop D when exposed to S have some
characteristic in common - older patients rather than younger, perhaps, or women
rather than men, or the sedentary rather than the active - and our plaintiff might be an
elderly, sedentary female. And epidemiological evidence of a doubling of risk is not
necessary for specific causation, either: first, because studies that fail to show a doubling
of risk may be flawed - for example, by failing to take account of the period of
pregnancy in which subjects are exposed to S, or by failing to take account of the fact
that subjects are included who may have been exposed to S in cold medication or sleep-
aids;99 and second, because even a good epidemiological study indicating to a high
degree of epistemic likelihood that there is a doubling of risk may also indicate that
those subjects who develop D have some characteristic (such as being over 50 or
sedentary or subject to allergies or whatever) that this plaintiff lacks. 100
There is a related problem with another argument sometimes encountered, that
since (say), it is believed on reliable evidence that 10% of cases of D are genetic, and
20% caused by environmental factors, while the causes of the remaining 70% are
unknown, the odds are that this plaintiff's D was not caused, as alleged, by exposure to
S. But here the confusion between statistical and epistemic probabilities is overlaid by
confusions of two other kinds: a false presumption that the cause of D must be either
genetic or environmental (when there may be interaction between the two); and treating
99 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
100 In a footnote, Judge Kozinski acknowledges this problem, at least in part: "[n]o doubt, there
will be unjust results with this standard. If a drug increases the likelihood of birth defects, but
doesn't more than double it, some plaintiffs whose injuries are attributable to the drug will be
unable to recover"; but dismisses it with the comment that "[t]here is a converse unfairness under
a regime that allows recovery to everyone who may have been affected by the drug" and that this
is a matter to be sorted out by the states. Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1320 n.13. He also acknowledges
the possibility that we might have evidence that a plaintiff belongs to a more-than-usually
susceptible sub-class of the population, but notes that the plaintiffs in Daubert had offered no
evidence to this effect. See id. at 1321 n.16.
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"unknown" as if it referred to another type of cause, like "genetic" or "environmental" -
when really, obviously, it is an expression of ignorance. If a plaintiff argues that it was
exposure to S that caused him to develop D, and the defendant replies that this is
unlikely, since we know that 70% of cases of D stem from unknown causes, the
defendant's response is defective - because if the plaintiff's claim is true, what we think
we know about what proportion of cases of D are caused by known factors, and what
by unknown factors, may not, after all, be genuine knowledge.
When Donald Rumsfeld made that notorious remark about "unknown
unknowns,"' 0 ' the topic, of course, was Iraqi intelligence. Perhaps I was the only person
in the country who didn't laugh derisively; at any rate, from a strictly epistemological
perspective, at least, Secretary Rumsfeld had a genuinely important point: not only may
we not have all the evidence we know would be relevant (the "known unknowns" in
Rumsfeldese); there may be evidence we don't have that we don't even realize is
relevant. This - the Rumsfeld Problem of unknown unknowns - is also relevant to the
next question on my list.
Can we infer from the fact that the causes of D are asyet unknown, and that a plaintiff
developed D after being exposed to S, that it was this exposure that caused Ms. X's or Mr. Y's D?1
02
No. Such evidence would certainly give us reason to look into the possibility that S is
the, or a, cause of D. But loose talk of "inference to the best explanation" disguises the
fact that what presently seems like the most plausible explanation may not really be so -
indeed, may not really be an explanation at all. We may not know all the potential causes
of D, or even which other candidate-explanations we would be wise to investigate.
I' Donald H. Rumsfeld, U.S. Sec) of Def., Dept. of Def., News Bting, Feb. 12, 2002, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil.transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2636 (last visited Oct. 15,
2008). ("Reports that say that something hasn't happened are always interesting to me. Because as
we know, there are known knowns, there are things that we know we know. We also know that
there are known unknowns, that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But
there are also unknown unknowns - the ones we don't know we don't know.')
102 See e.g. Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 318 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that the district
court had not abused its discretion in excluding Dr. Fozzard's testimony that Mr. Rosen's heart
attack was caused by his having worn a nicotine patch for three days before it occurred: "[w]hen
an unusual event follows closely on the heels of another unusual event, the ordinary person infers
a causal relation... But lay speculations on medical causality, however plausible, are a perilous
basis for inferring causation.. .?
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4. The Legal Argument
Under Daubert courts must screen proffered expert testimony'03 for relevance
and ("evidentiary") reliability. It is worth pausing for a moment to point out that
relevance, like reliability, is a factual matter. Whether (and to what degree) p is relevant
to q, that is, is not a matter of pure logic, but depends on facts about the world: if, but
only if, astrology is true, for example, the position of the planets at the time of your
birth is relevant to how things will turn out for you this week. But the focus in this paper
is on the reliability prong.
Reliability, I take it, is a matter of degree; admissibility, by contrast, is
categorical: a witness is either allowed to testify, or to testify to this or that question, 10 4
or not. So a court determining whether or not testimony is admissible is normally' 05
imposing a sharp, yes-or-no dichotomy on a continuum of degrees of reliability.106 The
mismatch between the categorical nature of admissibility and the gradational character
of reliability has been even more marked since 2000, when FRE 702 was revised to
require that expert testimony be based on "sufficient" data, "reliably" arrived at and
"reliably" applied to facts at issue.10 7 And the fact that a party facing a Daubert challenge
to their proffered expert testimony must show "by a preponderance of the evidence"
that this testimony meets the legal standard of reliability compounds the complexities.
What they must show, apparently, is that it is more likely than not that this testimony is
03 Some might prefer to put this a little differently: that Daubert clearly imposed this requirement
with respect to scientific testimony, but only when the Supreme Court clarified the scope of
Daubert in Kumbo Tire was it clear that the requirement also applies to expert testimony other than
the scientific. Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 525 U.S. 137 (1999).
104 See e.g. U.S. v. Llera Plaza, Nos. CR 98-362-10, 98-362-11, 98-362-12 (E.D. Pa. Jan 7 2002).
Judge Pollack ruled that while fingerprint examiners' testimony was admissible on certain matters,
"the parties will not be permitted to present testimony expressing an opinion of an expert witness
that a particular latent print matches, or does not match, the rolled prints of a particular person
and hence is, or is not, the fingerprint of that person." Id. at 19.
105 But see Transcript of Bench Ruling at 1484, U.S. v. Brown, N. 05 Cr. 538 (JSR) (S.D.N.Y. June
18, 2008) (reasoning that admissibility under Daubert need not be construed as categorical, and
permitting ballistics examiners to testify only that their conclusions were more likely than not;
and observing that the court "had a discussion about a year ago with Prof. Dan Capra [of
Columbia and Fordham Law Schools] and asked him "was Rule 702 supposed to be an absolute
rule, in the sense of either it is in or it is out" and he said no, not at all "). See also U.S. v.
Glynn, No. 06 Cr. 580 JSR), 2008 WL 4293317, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2008) (referring to the
court's ruling in Brown).
1(,6 See Dale Nance, Two Concepts of Reliabilit,, (APA) NEWSLETrER ON PHILOSOPHY AND LAW,
Fall 2003 at 123.
1"7 FED. R. EVID. 702.
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Iikey enough to satisfy the reliability prong of Daubert." Well: I have worked in
epistemology for many years now, but I have to say that it's a mystery to me what this
means.
But the problem most immediately relevant to present purposes is that Daubert
seems to impose a kind of evidentiary atomism'0 8 that pulls against the more holistic
character of most causation evidence. The problem is very noticeable in Joiner, when the
Supreme Court looked one by one at (some of the studies Joiner's experts' would have
cited had they been admitted, and finds that none of them would pass muster under
Daubert. But Judge Kozinski's 1995 ruling on remand reveals that the problem derives
from Daubert itself. Because the law had changed since the trial court granted summary
judgment for Merrell Dow in 1989, Judge Kozinski argued, there might be a case for
allowing the plaintiffs the opportunity to make a showing that their proffered expert
testimony met the new standard;10 9 however, he went on, there was no point in doing
this if it was already clear that their experts would have to be excluded under Dauber, as
they had been under Fgye. And in fact, he continued, this was already dear. Looking at
each of the Dauberts' experts' proffered testimony one by one, Judge Kozinski observes
first that all but one of them proposed only to testify that there was a possibility that
Bendectin causes birth defects, and didn't even claim, let alone show, that a mother's
taking the drug more than doubled the risk, and so would have to be excluded under the
relevance prong;"10 and then that Dr. Palmer the only expert who claimed more, that
Bendectin caused Jason Daubert's birth defects, simply had no methodology to speak of,
and so would have to be excluded under the reliability prong.
And this atomistic strategy is implicit in the Daubert Court's ruling, according to
which each item of expert evidence is to be screened for (relevance and) reliability. To be
admissible, el must be (relevant and) reliable, e2 must be (relevant and) reliable, e3 must
be (relevant and) reliable, . . ., and so on."' But if my epistemological argument is
correct, the combination of el, e2,.. ., en may warrant a causal conclusion better than any
108 Also sometimes called "corpuscularism." See Thomas McGarity, Our Science is Sound Science and
Their Science is Junk Science: Science-Based Strategies for Avoiding Accountabih60 and Responsibih'y for Risk-
Produdng Products andActivities, 52.4 U. KAN. L. REv. 897, 921 (2004).
109 See Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1315. Indeed, the rhetoric of Dauber 1993 was that the new standard
was more hospitable to the admission of expert testimony than the old, "austere" Fgye Rule. See
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 ("that austere standard, absent from, and incompatible with, the Federal
Rules of Evidence, should not be applied in federal trials").
110 See also supra note 98 and accompanying text.
t See McGarity, supra note 108, at 924 ("[u]nder the corpuscular approach, a study is either valid
or it is invalid, and it is either relevant of irrelevant. A conclusion based on invalid or irrelevant
studies cannot be relevant or reliable and must therefore be rejected").
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of its components alone - may be, in Dauber/s terminology, more reliable than any of its
components.
It might be thought - for a while I thought myself - that this difficulty could be
avoided if Daubert were interpreted as requiring, not that each item of expert testimony
reliably enough indicate the ultimate conclusion that exposure to S causes or promotes
D, but that each item reliably enough indicate the conclusion of the study referred to:
e.g., that the data from an epidemiological study reliably enough indicate the conclusion
"there is an elevated risk of n%, among those exposed to S, of developing D," that the
data from an animal study reliably enough indicate the conclusion "when animals of this
kind are exposed to this dose of S, delivered in this manner, m% of them develop D,"
... and so on. But while there is arguably some justification for this interpretation of the
ruling in Justice Blackmun's footnote about the intended meaning of evidentiary
reliability,"12 it does not, I'm afraid, solve the problem.
"[D]elusive exactness," Oliver Wendell Holmes once shrewdly observed, "is the
source of fallacy throughout the law." 3 And indeed, it is not clear that giving a precise
meaning to "preponderance of the evidence" would be desirable, even if it were
possible. But for the purposes of my argument it doesn't matter what, exactly, the
"preponderance of the evidence" standard - a phrase which, interestingly enough, has
the "weighing" metaphor built in14 - amounts to. For the essential point is that, however
one sets that standard, there could be instances in which the evidence is equally
balanced, i.e., in which the evidence warrants C and not-C to the same degree; and in
such circumstances even a minimal increment of warrant one way or the other would
give a "preponderance" in favor of C, or against it. And while it is true that evidence ei,
favorable to C, will improve the warrant of C less if it is itself less than solid (and
evidence ek, unfavorable to C, will decrease the warrant of C less if it is itself less than
solid), even such evidence might tip the scales, i.e., make the difference between "evenly
balanced" and "marginally favors C over not-C," or vice versa. And so, if some element
of evidence that might have tipped the scale is excluded under the reliability prong of
Dauber, this may actually impede assessment of the reliability of the scientific testimony
in its entirety - because the jury will never hear any element that the court excludes on
the grounds that it is insufficient by itself to meet the standard.
112 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590, n.9 (characterizing "evidentiary reliability").
113 Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 342 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
114 WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 929 (Merriman-Webster, 1991) (defining
-preponderance" as -superiority in weight, power, importance, or strength").
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Of course, though factual truth is undeniably important to substantive justice,
some rules of evidence - spousal privilege, for example, or FRE 407(b), under which
evidence of subsequent repair is inadmissible - deliberately allow considerations of
policy to preclude the presentation of evidence that might be highly relevant to the truth
of facts at issue. Whether such policy-oriented rules are justifiable is a whole other issue,
which I can't pursue here;115 but in any case, FRE 702 is not such a rule, but is focused
precisely and unambiguously on reliability.
More relevant to the present argument is the thought that courts excluding
scientific testimony under the reliability prong of Daubert may (at least sometimes) be
motivated by concern that a jury presented with a lot of weak evidence may draw an
unwarranted conclusion. A jury may, indeed, be misled in this way: for it doesn't follow
from the fact that, as I have argued here, a combination of pieces of evidence each
individually insufficient may jointly warrant a conclusion to a higher degree than any
component element, that any and evey combination of such evidence warrants the
conclusion to the required standard of proof. But a court may also be misled, perhaps in
the opposite direction; for it doesn't follow from the fact that a combination of pieces of
evidence each individually insufficient may also be jointly insufficient, that any and every
combination of such evidence fails to warrant the conclusion to the required degree. As
this reveals, the root of the problem is that, while the legal system relies increasingly on
scientific testimony, neither judges nor juries - nor attorneys, for that matter - are well-
equipped to make judgments on scientific questions where even highly-qualified and
competent experts may honestly, and reasonably, disagree." 6
"1 But see Susan Haack, Epistemology Legalized: Or, Truth, Justice, and the American Fay, 49 AM. J.
JURIS. 43, 56-60 (2004) (briefly addressing this issue).
116 My thanks to Pamela Lucken, of the University of Miami Law Library, for capable research
assistance; to Lee Tilson for information about retractions of medical articles and Celeste
Monforton for references on smoking and lung cancer; and to Mark Migotti, Adina Schwartz,
Marina Teplitsky, and, especially, Joseph Sanders for helpful comments and suggestions.
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